Emerging RiskNov 18, 202614 min read

When will quantum computers break encryption? What Gartner, Forrester, IDC and Forbes expect

A network engineer with a clipboard checks a row of server racks in a data-centre aisle, with a printed multi-year migration timetable pinned on a board at the end.
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CyberRank Research

Part of: Post-Quantum Cryptography Assessment

No one knows exactly when quantum computers will be able to break the encryption that protects most of the internet, but the main analyst forecasts now cluster between 2029 and the mid-2030s. That day is often called Q-day. Gartner says today's public-key encryption becomes unsafe by 2029 and fully breakable by 2034, and Forrester projects 2030. IDC and recent Forbes contributors avoid a single year and point to regulatory deadlines instead. CyberRank helps you see which of your vendors still use encryption that quantum computers could break.

Executive summary

  • When will quantum computers break encryption? Analyst forecasts cluster between 2029 and the mid-2030s: Gartner says unsafe by 2029 and fully breakable by 2034, Forrester says 2030, and IDC and Forbes contributors give no fixed year.
  • The day a quantum computer can break the encryption behind secure websites, VPNs and digital signatures is often called Q-day.
  • NIST finalised its transition plan in October 2026: today's public-key encryption methods are deprecated (to be phased out) after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, whatever the true date turns out to be.
  • Data stolen today can be unlocked later, so information that must stay secret for many years is already at risk.
  • CyberRank is suited to finding vendors that still use encryption quantum computers could break: its quantum-crypto exposure check (Beta) flags them from their internet-facing services.

What is Q-day, the day quantum computers break encryption?

Q-day is the day a large enough quantum computer can break the public-key encryption that protects most internet traffic, digital signatures and online identity.

A quantum computer is a new kind of machine that can solve certain maths problems far faster than today's computers. Some of those problems are exactly the ones that keep encrypted data safe. The encryption methods at risk are called RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic-curve cryptography. They secure website connections (HTTPS), VPNs, software signing and many login systems.

Q-day is a capability milestone, and it will not arrive with an announcement. Post-quantum cryptography is the name for replacement encryption that runs on ordinary computers and is designed to resist quantum attacks. For the standards and how they work, see our guide to quantum security and post-quantum cryptography.

How CyberRank helps: its quantum-crypto exposure check (Beta) is part of the outside-in assessment, so you can check vendors without their cooperation.

Plain-language guide to the terms around Q-day
Q-dayMeaningThe day a quantum computer can break mainstream public-key encryptionHow CyberRank helpsGives an outside-in view (from the internet, with no access to the vendor) of vendor exposure before that day
Large enough quantum computerMeaningOne big and reliable enough to break real encryption keys; experts call it a cryptographically relevant quantum computerHow CyberRank helpsNot applicable; CyberRank does not model quantum hardware
Steal now, decrypt laterMeaningCollecting encrypted data today to unlock it once such a computer exists (also called harvest now, decrypt later)How CyberRank helpsFlags vendors that still use encryption quantum computers could break (Beta)
Post-quantum cryptographyMeaningReplacement encryption designed to resist quantum attackHow CyberRank helpsHelps you see which vendors have not yet moved

When do analysts expect quantum computers to break encryption?

Analysts expect it between 2029 and the mid-2030s: Gartner says unsafe by 2029 and fully breakable by 2034, Forrester says 2030, and IDC and Forbes contributors give no fixed year.

The four sources most often quoted in board papers measure different things, which explains most of the gap between them.

What each source says
GartnerView on the dateUnsafe by 2029; fully breakable by 2034PublishedResearch of July 2024, still on Gartner's public page in November 2026What it measuresWhen today's public-key encryption stops being safe to rely on, then when it breaksHow CyberRank helpsShows which vendors rely on it today (Beta)
ForresterView on the dateQ-day by 2030PublishedThe State of Quantum Computing, 2026 (March 2026) and blog of 11 March 2026What it measuresWhen quantum computers can break the encryption used for secure connectionsHow CyberRank helpsTracks vendor posture over time
IDCView on the dateNo public year; frames risk around the 2030 and 2035 deadlinesPublishedBlog, 14 January 2026What it measuresWhen organisations must act, and demand for quantum risk assessmentsHow CyberRank helpsSupports the vendor part of a risk assessment
Forbes (contributors)View on the dateNo fixed date; cites expert odds and vendor targets of 2029 to 2031PublishedArticles from February and October 2026What it measuresCommentary that summarises other forecastsHow CyberRank helpsGives an outside-in view whichever date you adopt

Gartner: two milestones, 2029 and 2034

Gartner's public guidance says advances in quantum computing will make public-key encryption unsafe by 2029 and fully breakable by 2034. The underlying report, Postquantum Cryptography: The Time to Prepare is Now! (Horvath and others, 1 July 2024), frames 2029 as a planning date.

In practice, "unsafe" means you should stop trusting this encryption for data that must stay secret, even though no public break has happened. Gartner describes its forecasts as opinions, not statements of fact.

Forrester: 2030

Forrester's The State of Quantum Computing, 2026 projects Q-day by 2030. Brian Hopkins, VP of Emerging Tech Portfolio at Forrester, wrote on 11 March 2026 that the same advances bringing quantum computing to business use are also bringing that day forward.

Forrester also warns that better algorithms can move the timeline quickly by reducing the hardware needed.

IDC: plan to the deadlines, not a date

IDC's public material does not commit to a year. Cathy Huang, Senior Research Director at IDC, points instead to the migration deadlines set by governments and NIST for 2030 and 2035.

IDC predicts that 40% of Global 2000 organisations will engage cybersecurity professional services firms by 2027 to run quantum risk assessments.

Forbes: contributor commentary that points to the deadlines

Forbes publishes contributor articles, so this is a set of individual opinions, not a Forbes forecast. Writing on 30 October 2026, John Bremen said Q-day has "no fixed date, but the deadlines around it do." He reports that several quantum manufacturers told WTW they expect machines capable of breaking RSA encryption by 2029 or 2030, while noting that such targets have slipped before.

Chuck Brooks, writing in February 2026, cites Michele Mosca's long-standing estimate of a 50% chance of breaking RSA-2048 (a widely used key size) by 2031.

How CyberRank helps: whichever forecast your board adopts, the quantum-crypto exposure check (Beta) shows which vendors are furthest from it.

Why have the forecasts moved closer?

Three developments between 2025 and 2026 pulled most estimates forward: fewer qubits needed to break common encryption, earlier internal deadlines at large technology firms, and rising expert odds.

Some researchers argue that the change will be a gradual loss of trust in specific kinds of keys, starting with targeted state attacks. That reading leads to the same practical answer: plan before the date, not after it. For the vendor side, see our article on post-quantum third-party risk, and on how often vendors should be reassessed.

How CyberRank helps: nightly reassessment of monitored vendors means a change in a vendor's observable encryption appears in your events without a new questionnaire round.

  1. Smaller machines could be enough. In May 2025, Google researcher Craig Gidney estimated that RSA-2048 encryption could be broken in under a week with fewer than one million error-prone qubits (the basic units of a quantum computer). A 2019 estimate had put the figure at about 20 million.
  2. Earlier internal deadlines. On 25 March 2026, Google set 2029 as the target to complete its own move to quantum-resistant encryption, citing progress in hardware, error correction and estimates of what it takes to break keys.
  3. Higher expert odds. The Global Risk Institute and evolutionQ Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2025, dated 9 March 2026, put the averaged likelihood of a machine that can break encryption within 10 years at 28% to 49%, the highest 10-year figure in the series.

Why does the exact date matter less than you think?

Because attackers can record encrypted traffic today and unlock it once a powerful enough quantum computer exists, so data that must stay secret for years is exposed now.

Michele Mosca's widely used rule makes this concrete. If the years your data must stay secret plus the years your migration will take exceed the years until the date, you are already late. Our guide to harvest now, decrypt later covers this attack in detail.

Digital signatures are a separate concern. A powerful quantum computer could forge signatures on software updates or certificates. Google has said it now prioritises migration for login and authentication services for this reason.

Migration times in the table are fictional planning examples; use your own estimates.

How CyberRank helps: its view of vendor impact and breach likelihood lets you focus quantum questions on the vendors that hold your longest-lived data.

Shelf-life test against a 2030 date (illustrative)
Daily transaction logsShelf life1 yearMigration time3 yearsLate if the date is 2030?Close to the line
Customer identity recordsShelf life10+ yearsMigration time4 yearsLate if the date is 2030?Yes
Medical or insurance recordsShelf life20+ yearsMigration time4 yearsLate if the date is 2030?Yes
Firmware signing keys in long-life devicesShelf lifeDevice life, often 10+ yearsMigration time5 yearsLate if the date is 2030?Yes

Which deadlines apply whatever the date?

Regulators and standards bodies have already set dates that bind you or your vendors whatever the true date is: NIST deprecates today's public-key encryption after 2030 and disallows it after 2035.

The deadlines below come from official sources: NIST IR 8547, the EU Coordinated Implementation Roadmap and the UK NCSC timelines for migration. For how they fit with other vendor-risk dates, see our overview of vendor risk deadlines from 2026 to 2035, and for the EU supply chain angle, our NIS2 supply chain security page.

Official post-quantum milestones
NIST (US)MilestoneFinal transition plan publishedDate27 October 2026SourceNIST final transition planHow CyberRank helpsGives vendors' observable status to compare
NIST (US)MilestoneQuantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms deprecatedDateAfter 2030SourceNIST final transition planHow CyberRank helpsFlags vendors still relying on them (Beta)
NIST (US)MilestoneSame algorithms disallowed under NIST standardsDateAfter 2035SourceNIST final transition planHow CyberRank helpsFlags vendors still relying on them (Beta)
EU Member StatesMilestoneNational transition started; high-risk use cases migratedDateStart by end of 2026; high-risk by end of 2030SourceEU roadmapHow CyberRank helpsSupports vendor questions against these dates
EU Member StatesMilestoneMedium- and low-risk use cases, as far as feasibleDate2035SourceEU roadmapHow CyberRank helpsSupports vendor questions against these dates
UK NCSCMilestoneDiscovery and initial plan; early priority migration; full migrationDateBy 2028; by 2031; by 2035SourceUK NCSC guidanceHow CyberRank helpsSupports vendor questions against these dates

Indonesian context

Indonesian media report that BSSN, the national cyber and cryptography agency, is preparing a national cryptography roadmap for 2027 to 2035 and has set up a task force to coordinate post-quantum migration. The sources reviewed for this article did not include a binding BSSN, OJK or Komdigi deadline for private-sector organisations, so check the official publications before relying on a date.

Indonesian organisations also inherit the dates above. Cloud providers, payment networks and software vendors serving EU or US customers must follow them, and their changes reach you through the supply chain. For banks, see our article on quantum readiness for banks.

How CyberRank helps: its questionnaire builder lets you ask vendors for their quantum-readiness roadmap against these dates, with evidence upload and expiry dates.

How to prepare for quantum computers breaking encryption

Pick one planning date, list where you use encryption, rank data by how long it must stay secret, then bring your vendors into the plan and migrate in priority order.

  1. Pick a planning date. Choose one date your organisation will plan to, for example Gartner's 2029 or Forrester's 2030, and record why. Your team owns this decision.
  2. List where you use encryption. Note where RSA, elliptic-curve and Diffie-Hellman encryption are used in your own systems, including certificates, VPNs and software signing. This is internal work; outside-in tools cannot see it. Crypto-agility, the ability to swap encryption methods without rebuilding systems, makes later changes cheaper.
  3. Rank data by how long it must stay secret. Identify data that must stay confidential beyond your planning date, and the systems and vendors that hold it. Our guide to which vendors to review first helps with the ordering.
  4. Map vendor exposure. Check which vendors, and your vendors' own suppliers, still use encryption quantum computers could break. CyberRank automates this outside-in check with its quantum-crypto exposure check (Beta), part of the post-quantum cryptography assessment.
  5. Ask for roadmaps. Send vendors a short questionnaire covering their encryption methods, migration plan and target dates. CyberRank can send questionnaires automatically to vendors below your baseline.
  6. Update contracts. Add quantum-readiness and crypto-agility requirements to new and renewed contracts. This needs your legal and procurement teams.
  7. Migrate in priority order. Start with long-lived data and signing systems, using the new NIST-approved algorithms (ML-KEM for key exchange and ML-DSA for signatures).
  8. Monitor and report. Track progress for your board. CyberRank's nightly reassessment and Management Report give you vendor-side evidence.

Where CyberRank does not help

CyberRank does not predict when quantum computers will arrive or assess quantum hardware. Its quantum-crypto exposure check (Beta) sees only what a vendor exposes on the internet. It cannot see encryption inside a vendor's internal network, stored data, backups or embedded devices.

It cannot build your internal list of where encryption is used, migrate systems or decide which regulatory deadline applies to you. A good rating does not certify that a vendor is quantum-safe. For those gaps, use internal discovery tools, vendor questionnaires and audits, contract clauses and legal review.

Conclusion

Nobody can name the day quantum computers will break today's encryption. Gartner plans for 2029 to 2034, Forrester projects 2030, and IDC and Forbes contributors point to the deadlines that already exist. Those deadlines are firm: NIST deprecates today's public-key encryption after 2030 and disallows it after 2035, and the EU expects high-risk systems migrated by the end of 2030.

Because data stolen today can be unlocked later, the useful question is how long your data must stay secret and how long your migration will take. CyberRank gives you an outside-in view of which vendors still use encryption quantum computers could break, so you can prioritise them.

About this article

This article interprets published timelines for general information and is not legal advice. Analyst views are attributed to their published sources and reflect each author's or firm's own opinion. Product capabilities are described as of 18 November 2026; features marked Beta may change.

References

  1. Gartner, Begin Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography Now (accessed 18 November 2026)
  2. Gartner, Postquantum Cryptography: The Time to Prepare is Now!, M. Horvath, S. Almond, M. Brisse, C. Dekate (1 July 2024)
  3. Forrester, Practical Quantum Computing By 2030 Is Likely, And So Is Q-Day, B. Hopkins (11 March 2026)
  4. Forrester, The State Of Quantum Computing, 2026 (March 2026)
  5. IDC, Is Your Business Quantum-Ready? Why Risk Assessments Are Critical Now, C. Huang (14 January 2026)
  6. Forbes, Why Quantum Computing Risk Has Become A Board-Level Issue, J. Bremen (30 October 2026)
  7. Forbes, Q-Day: Catastrophic For Businesses Ignoring Quantum-Resistant Encryption, C. Brooks (16 February 2026)
  8. NIST, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547 (final, 27 October 2026)
  9. European Commission, A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (23 June 2025)
  10. UK NCSC, Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (20 March 2025)
  11. Bisnis.com, BSSN Siapkan Roadmap Kriptografi 2027–2035 (20 October 2026)
  12. Google, Quantum frontiers may be closer than they appear, H. Adkins and S. Schmieg (25 March 2026)
  13. C. Gidney, How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917 (21 May 2025)
  14. Global Risk Institute and evolutionQ, Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2025, M. Mosca and M. Piani (9 March 2026)

Frequently asked questions

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See which of your vendors still rely on encryption quantum computers could break with the post-quantum cryptography assessment.

Check your vendors' quantum exposure